UN PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA: EFFECTIVENESS AND PROBLEMS

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1.BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The UN Security Council authorizes peace operations by an affirmative vote of nine of the fifteen members without a veto from the five permanent members: the United States, China, France, Russia, the UK. The Security Council has authorized more than fifty peace operations in the years since the Cold War.

The UN deploys peacekeeping forces to prevent or contain fighting; stabilize post-conflict zones; help implement peace accords; and assist democratic transitions. To achieve those goals, the UN outlines the following peace-building activities:

• Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants;
• Landmine removal and associated activities;
• Rule-of-law related activities;
• Human rights protection and promotion;
• Electoral assistance;
• Support for the restoration of state authority; and
• Promotion of social and economic recovery and development.

The UN generally follows three principles for deploying peacekeepers:

• Main parties to the conflict must consent;
• Peacekeepers should remain impartial but not neutral; and
• Peacekeepers cannot use force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.

However, UN peacekeepers are increasingly deployed to war zones when not all the main parties have consented, such as in Mali and eastern DRC. There is also mounting international pressure for peacekeepers to play a more robust role in protecting civilians. Despite the principle of impartiality, UN peacekeepers have been tasked with offensive operations against designated enemy combatants, as in Mali and the DRC. “Contemporary mandates have often blurred the lines separating peacekeeping, stabilization, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, atrocity prevention, and state-building,” George Washington University’s Paul D. Williams writes in a new CFR report.

Determining the effectiveness of UN mission demands investigating the structure and how are peace operations are staffed and funded?Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan send the most troops to UN peacekeeping missions, while the United States, Japan, and France are the top funders. The top troop contributors to AMISOM are Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Kenya, and funding comes largely from the UN and the European Union. They disconnect between those nations that send troops and those that fund missions is often a source of conflict. Wealthy nations spend the most on peacekeeping, yet they send relatively few troops; meanwhile, countries that either sends troops or whose citizens are directly affected by peacekeeping missions often have less say in how they are designed and mandated.

A 2014 internal review of peacekeeping practices related to civilian protection exposed some of these tensions. Researchers found that peacekeepers failed to protect civilians on several occasions. Countries that fund the annual UN peacekeeping budget of nearly $8 billion were angered by the findings, while troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) demanded raises to the reimbursement rates their soldiers receive for serving in UN missions, rates which had not increased in more than a decade. (The UN reimburses countries that contribute troops a little more than $1,000 per soldier per month, and AMISOM troops now earn roughly the same allowances as UN peacekeepers.)Both India and Brazil have cited their countries’ personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping in their bids to become permanent members of the Security Council, and several African governments have complained about having little say in the design and mandating of UN operations on the continent. “They would like to escape the tutelage of the UN in future crises,” says says Richard Gowan, an expert on multilateral security institutions at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Leaders in Africa and within the UN have called for African forces to play a larger role in securing peace and stability on the continent, but budget constraints persist. While the UN has a regular peacekeeping budget, the AU must continually seek out donors, such as the UN, the EU, and the United States, to fund its missions. Only 2.3 percent of the AU’s budget comes from AU member states.“Countries with more developed military capabilities—countries from the OECD—need to come back into peacekeeping in a way they haven’t been in recent years” —Bruce Jones, Brookings Institution “When the AU deploys a mission, it always needs to find external assistance,” says GWU’s Williams. As a result, the AU cannot quickly deploy or sustain troops in the field. “The lack of indigenous sources of finance also undermines the AU's credibility as a leading player in peace and security issues on the continent and reduces its ability to exercise ownership of particular initiatives,” he says.

Peace operations in Africa are increasingly collaborations between the UN and AU. For example, in Somalia, AMISOM member states provide troops while the UN provides funding, training, logistics, and planning support. UNAMID, a UN-AU hybrid mission in Darfur, absorbed and expanded a mission initially led solely by the AU. 

The research intends to investigate UN Peacekeeping in Africa; its effectiveness and problems

1.2.STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The problem confronting this research is to appraise Un Peacekeeping in Africa; its effectiveness and problem. The research intends to investigate the nature, operations of UN Peacekeeping in Africa

1.3. RESEARCH QUESTION

1. What is the nature of UN PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA?
2. What is the problem encountered?
3. What is the effectiveness of the mission?

1.4.OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

1. To appraise UN Peacekeeping in Africa
2. To determine the effectiveness of the mission
3. To determine the problem encountered

1.5.SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

1.     The study shall evaluate the nature and progress of UN Peacekeeping in         Africa

2.     It shall elucidate the challenges and determine its objectives

3.     The study shall be a veritable source of information on UN Peacekeeping in     Africa

1.6.STATEMENT OF THE HYPOTHESIS

H0    UN Peacekeeping in Africa not significant

H0    The problems  encountered  in UN Peacekeeping in Africa is low

H0    The effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping in Africa is not effective

1.7.SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study shall focus on the appraisal of UN Peacekeeping in Africa. It shall determine the problems and effectiveness of the mission.

1.8.DEFINITION OF TERMS

UN MANDATE:

The UN Security Council authorizes peace operations by an affirmative vote of nine of the fifteen members without a veto from the five permanent members: the United States, China, France, Russia, the UK. The Security Council has authorized more than fifty peace operations in the years since the Cold War.

The UN deploys peacekeeping forces to prevent or contain fighting; stabilize post-conflict zones; help implement peace accords; and assist democratic transitions. To achieve those goals, the UN outlines the followingpeacebuilding activities:

• Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants;
• Landmine removal and associated activities;
• Rule-of-law related activities;
• Human rights protection and promotion;
• Electoral assistance;
• Support for the restoration of state authority; and
• Promotion of social and economic recovery and development.

The UN generally follows three principles for deploying peacekeepers:

• Main parties to the conflict must consent;
• Peacekeepers should remain impartial but not neutral; and
• Peacekeepers cannot use force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.

REFERENCES

1. Tom Woodhouse and Tamara Duffey, et al(eds).

Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution. (New

York: UNITARPOCI, 2000), P.22.

2. Ibid. p.23.

3. Id.

4. Garba CA Maj Gen, Capacity Building for Crisis

Management in Africa. (Lagos: Gabumo Publishing

Limited, 1998), p. 149.

5. Nwolise OBC, ‘ECOMOG Peacekeeping Operations in

Liberia: Effects of Political Stability in West African

Sub-Region’ in African Peace Review Journal for Peace

Research and Conflict Resolution Vol 1. No 1. (Abuja, 1997),

p. 39.